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FEDERAL COMMERCIAL PAPER AND THE
FEDERAL COMMON LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Clark' in Bank ofAmerica National Trust & Savings Associ-
ation v. United States' held that the United States, as the drawer-
drawee, could not recover from the presenting bank the amount of a
number of fraudulently issued drafts that were drawn on and paid by
the United States prior to its knowledge that the drafts were fraudu-
lently procured. The court held that the facts came under the imposter
rule3 which dictates that the drawer, here the United States, is liable for
payment on the fraudulently issued drafts rather than holding the
presenting bank liable on their stamped warranty of prior endorse-
ments.4 In a footnote to the opinion, Justice Clark made the following
policy statement:
The result we reach here is the same that would necessar-
ily be reached by application of the Uniform Commercial
Code, now in effect in all fifty states. Unfortunately, the
U.C.C. has not yet been adopted for federal application by
Congress, and the federal courts thus face the disturbing pros-
pect of reaching on the same set of facts, different conclusions
through the use of common law principles from that of states
governed by the U.C.C. in commercial litigation.
The commercial interests of our country would be better
served if interested parties could expect uniformity in the fed-
1. Associate Justice Tom C. Clark, United States Supreme Court (Ret.), sitting by designa-
tion.
2. 552 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1977).
3. See U.C.C. § 3-405 and comments following. All citations to Uniform Commercial
Code sections, comments, and tables refer to the 1972 Official Text and Comments of the Uniform
Commercial Code. See also W. BRrrrON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES 715-25
(1943); F. BEuTEL, BR.NAN'S NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 470-80 (7th ed. 1948).
4. The warranty is deemed to be made upon presentment.
The presenting bank and the indorsers of a check presented to the Treasury for payment
are deemed to guarantee to the Treasury that all prior indorsements are genuine,
whether or not an express guaranty is placed on the check. When the first indorsement
has been made by one other than the payee personally, the presenting bank and the
indorsers are deemed to guarantee to the Treasury, in addition to other warranties, that
the person who so endorsed had unqualified capacity and authority to indorse the check
in behalf of the payee.
Treas. Reg. § 240.4 (1974).
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eral and state courts' application of commercial law. To this
end, we would urge Congress to adopt, in the not too distant
future, the U.C.C. for federal application, as our fifty states
have already done for local application.'
Using Justice Clark's recommendation as a basis, this article will
examine the origins and justifications of the federal common law in the
area of federal commercial paper, a number of the conflicts between
federal and state laws governing commercial paper, and the proposals
for federal reform in dealing with federal commercial paper. Favor
will be given to congressional enactment of the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.), articles 3 and 4, for federal application.
II. FACTS
An examination of the facts of Bank ofAmerica National Trust &
Savings Association v. United States6 will bring the issues into focus.
An unknown employee of the United States Air Corps Station Disburs-
ing Office at El Toro, California, forged military pay orders, records,
and drafts in favor of nonexistent servicemen and subsequently en-
dorsed and cashed the fraudulently obtained drafts. The bank in turn
presented the drafts to the Treasurer of the United States for payment
with the bank's endorsement warranting prior endorsements.' The
Treasurer paid the draft, and it was stipulated that all parties acted in
good faith and without notice of the fraudulent scheme. Upon learn-
ing of the fraud, the United States sued to recover the amount paid out
to the bank on the basis of the bank's endorsement warranty. The
federal district court found in favor of the United States. The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and found in favor of the bank
on the grounds that the imposter rule governed the facts of the case.
Justice Clark while discussing the imposter rule cited Atlantic National
Bank v. United States:8
In the process of fashioning a federal jurisprudence con-
cerning the Government's own commercial paper [citation
omitted] this Court. .. along with many others, has adopted
the "imposter rule." Under it, when the drawer or issuer of a
check intends that it shall go to the person falsely pretending
to be another who is in fact nonexistent, the endorsement in
5. Bank of America Natl Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. United States, 552 F.2d 302, 303 n.1 (9th
Cir. 1977).
6. Id. at 302.
7. Treas. Reg. § 240.4 (1974). See note 4 supra.
8. 250 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1957).
1978]
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the fictitious payee's name by the pretender is not a forgery
and an endorser bank is not liable to the drawee-drawer on
the traditional stamped endorsement "all prior endorsements
guaranteed." 9
Therefore, under the imposter rule the bank will not be liable on
its guaranty of prior endorsements, whereas under the standard forged
endorsement case it will be liable to the party to whom the warranty
was given.1" The conflict between the trial court's holding and the ap-
pellate court's opinion in the principal case illustrates the potential dis-
crepancies between the state of the law under the U.C.C."1 and the
federal common law which has governed federal commercial paper
since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Cleafeld Trust Co.
v. United States.'2
III. BACKGROUND
The federal general common law flourished under the regime of
Swift v. Tyson. 3  This period ended with the Supreme Court's opinion
in Erie AA v. Tompkins'4 which interpreted section 34 of the Federal
Judiciary Act:' 5
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution
or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the
law of the State. And whether the law of the State shall be
declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court
in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. There is no
9. Id at 116 (footnote qmitted).
10. In the normal forgery case the first solvent party to deal with the forger will usually have
to absorb the loss, assuming the forger is not to be found or is insolvent. See, e.g., National
Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454 (1945); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States,
318 U.S. 363 (1943); United States v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 491 F.2d 851 (8th Cir. 1974).
See also U.C.C. §§ 3-419(l)(c), 3-419(3), 3-417, 4-207.
11. Louisiana is the only state in which the entire Code has not been enacted. See U.C.C.,
Table 1. On January 1, 1975, articles 1, 3,4, and 5 became effective in Louisiana also. LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 10:1-101 to 5-117 (West Supp. 1975).
12. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
13. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). For a discussion and history of the Swift case, see Teton, The
Story of Swift v. Tyson, 35 ILL. L. REV. 519 (1941).
14. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See generaly Boner, Erie .Tompkins."A Study in Judicial Precedent,
40 TEx. L. REv. 509 (1962); Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts; The Brooding Omnipresence of
Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE LJ. 267 (1946); Merrigan, Erie to York to Regan:.A Trple Play on the
Federal Rules, 3 VAND. L. Rav. 711 (1950); Wright, The Federal Courts andthe Nature and Qualty
of State Law, 13 WAYNE REV. 317 (1967).
15. Ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976)). "The laws of
the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Con-
gress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the
courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976).
[Vol. 14:208
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federal general common law.16
The principal justification for the holding in Erie was the absence
of constitutional authority to fashion a federal general common law in
a federal diversity suit. The forming of a federal general common law
was seen as an unconstitutional invasion of the state's powers. Fur-
thermore, as a policy matter the growth of the federal general common
law fostered forum shopping and nonuniformity between state and fed-
eral courts concerned with the same issues. Accordingly, under Erie
the federal courts must look to state substantive rules of law, both stat-
utory and decisional, in diversity cases unless the Constitution, a treaty,
or an Act of Congress otherwise provides,17 or unless the state law sim-
ply does not apply to a particular transaction due to its federal charac-
ter. 8
Despite the apparent rejection of a federal general common law in
Erie, the Supreme Court later made it clear that there remained an
extensive area of "independent federal judicial decision" both within
and without the constitutional realm. 9 Since the Erie decision, the
federal courts have recognized that federal law will govern in such mat-
ters as apportionment of the water flowing in an interstate stream,20
liability or immunity of a telegraph company for transmission of
libelous messages,2 public lands and Indian affairs,22 bankruptcy
cases, 23 and government contracts including transactions where the
government is exercising a constitutional power.24
It was a facet of this last exception that enabled the Supreme
Court to revitalize the federal common law in the area of federal com-
16. Erie R.R. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). But see note 19 infra and accompanying
text.
17. Where the Constitution, a federal treaty, or an Act of Congress dictates, federal law will
govern by virtue of the supremacy clause. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976). Note the language "in cases where they apply." Id.
19. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 308 (1947). See also, Monaghan, For-
ward- Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1975); Newman, The Federal Common
Law, 26 DicTA 303 (1949); Note, Federal Courts - Federal Common Law Determines Lessor's Duty
to Convey Possession to Government Standing as Lessee, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 1078 (1975); Note,
Exceptions to Erie v. Tompkins: The Survival of Federal Common Law, 59 HARv. L. REV. 966
(1946).
20. Hinderlinder v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). This
decision was handed down at the same time as Erie and was written by Justice Brandeis who was
also the author of the Erie opinion.
21. O'Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 F.2d 539 (lst Cir. 1940).
22. United States v. Fullard-Leo, 331 U.S. 256 (1947); Board of County Comm'rs v. United
States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939).
23. Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726 (1946); Wragg v. Federal Land Bank, 317 U.S. 325
(1943).
24. United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174 (1944).
19781
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mercial paper. Clea./ield Trust Co. v. United States25 held that "the
rights and duties of the United States on commercial paper which it
issues are governed by federal rather than local law."26 The Court,
noting the lack of legislative regulation of federal commercial paper,
determined that a federal common law should apply to the govern-
ment's exercising of its constitutional function of disbursing funds for
payment of debts.27 The Court also perceived a need for uniformity in
the law of federal commercial paper.28 The Court believed that the
application of state laws to federal commercial paper would impair its
negotiability by subjecting the rights and duties of the United States to
exceptional uncertainty.2 9
Once having determined that federal common law would govern
the rights and duties emanating from federal commercial paper,30 the
Cleaq6eld Court had to decide what the source of the federal common
law would be. The Court was faced with the choice of drawing from
state law or of forming a nation-wide rule. This latter alternative was
selected based primarily on the need for uniformity in dealing with all
government paper. In formulating such a rule of federal common law,
the Court referred to the federal law merchant 31 developed throughout
the century under Swift v. Tyson.32  The Court's animosity towards
state law appeared to stem from the lack of uniformity among the vari-
ous states' laws governing commercial paper.33
Clear/leld concerned a check drawn on the Treasurer of the United
States to the order of Clair A. Barner and dated April 28, 1936. The
check had been mailed but had never reached Barner. An unknown
person had obtained the check and had presented it to the J.C. Penney
Co. in Clearfield, Pennsylvania, claiming to be the named payee. The
store cashed the check on his forged endorsement. Subsequently, the
25. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
26. Id. at 366.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 367.
29. Id.
30. See Dumbauld, The Clear Field of Clearfeld, 61 DICK. L. REV. 299 (1957); Friendly, In
Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 383, 410 (1964);
Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National
and State Rulesfor Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797, 802-03 (1957).
31. 318 U.S. at 367.
32. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
33. At the time of the Clearfeld decision the Negotiable Instruments Law (N.I.L.) was in
effect in all 50 states, the Canal Zone, District of Columbia, Philippine Islands, Puerto Rico, and
the Virgin Islands. However, there was a great deal of statutory and judicial variation among the
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store endorsed the check over to the Clearfield Trust Co. who in turn
put its endorsement on the check as follows: "Pay to the order of Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Prior Endorsements Guaranteed." 34
Clearfield then collected the full amount from the Federal Reserve
Bank and paid it over to J.C. Penney Co. Neither Clearfield nor J.C.
Penney Co. had any knowledge of the forgery. On May 10, 1936,
Barner notified the appropriate government officials that he had not
received the check, and on November 30, 1936, he executed an affidavit
stating that the endorsement of his name on the check was a forgery.
Clearfield was not given any notice of the forgery until January 12,
1937, and was not notified that the United States was seeking reim-
bursement until August 31, 1937.1' The trial court found that the
United States had unreasonably delayed in giving notice of the forgery
to Clearfield and, therefore, that Pennsylvania law barred the United
States from obtaining reimbursement from Clearfield. The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed,36 and the Supreme Court af-
firmed, holding that Clearfield was required to show actual damages in
order to bar the United States from reimbursement rather than merely
a showing of unreasonable delay in notifying Clearfield of the for-
gery.37 Not only was federal common law applied, as opposed to
Pennsylvania law, but a showing of actual damages beyond the mere
unreasonable delay was required by the federal law merchant 38 which
served as the source for the federal common law. Hence, a separate
body of law, the federal common law governing federal commercial
paper, had survived the mandate of Erie.
Two years after Clea.fteld, the Supreme Court again asserted the
maxim that the federal common law governed federal commercial pa-
per in National Metropolitan Bank v. United States.39 A civilian clerk
in the Paymaster's office of the Marine Corps procured 144 government
checks by forging pay and travel mileage vouchers in the names of liv-
ing Marine Corps officers. He forged their endorsements, added his
own second endorsement, and deposited or cashed the checks at
Anacostia Bank which endorsed the checks and transmitted them to
34. See note 4 supra.
35. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 364-65 (1943).
36. United States v. Clearfield Trust Co., 130 F.2d 93 (3rd Cir. 1942), aJ'd, 318 U.S. 363
(1943).
37. 318 U.S. at 369.
38. See, eg., Ladd & Tilton Bank v. United States, 30 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1929); United States
v. National Rockland Bank, 35 F. Supp. 912 (D. Mass. 1940); United States v. National City
Bank, 28 F. Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). Compare U.C.C. § 4-406 (4).
39. 323 U.S. 454, 456 (1945).
1978]
6
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 14 [1978], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol14/iss1/8
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
National Metropolitan Bank. National Metropolitan Bank then
presented the checks to the Government with the required guaranty of
prior endorsements.40 The Government paid the checks and, after
their discovery of the fraud and forgeries, demanded reimbursement
from National Metropolitan Bank based on a breach of its express war-
ranty.4' The bank's primary defense was that "the government's dis-
bursing agencies neglected properly to supervise and examine the
transactions both before and after the first and succeeding checks were
issued, thereby delaying discovery of the fraud, and this neglect, not the
bank's guaranty, caused the government's loss. ' '42 The district court
granted the Government's motion for judgment on the pleadings, and
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed. 3 The
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the "negligence of a drawer-
drawee in failing to discover fraud prior to a guaranty of the genuine-
ness of prior endorsements does not absolve the guarantor from liabil-
ity in cases where the prior endorsements have been forged." 44
Thus under Cleaqfield and National Metropolitan, the Supreme
Court had established that federal common law governs federal com-
mercial paper and that the federal law merchant rather than state law
could be used as a source for federal common law. In addition these
cases applied the federal common law and held that the presenting
bank would be liable on its guaranty of prior endorsements regardless
of the Government's negligence, as the drawer-drawee, in failing to dis-
cover the fraud prior to the bank's guaranty of the forged endorse-
ments.
IV. ANALYsis
The dispute in the Bank of America National Trust & Savings Asso-
ciation v. United States4" involved the Government's contention that
the rule in National Metropolitan" and its progeny47 was controlling,
40. See note 4 supra.
41. The Government's complaint actually contained two counts, one for breach of express
warranty and one for money paid under a mistake of fact. 323 U.S. at 455.
42. Id. The bank also set up two other defenses: that the endorsement did not amount to a
guaranty of the payee's signature and that issuance of the checks by the government was a war-
ranty that they were not "fictitious," but genuine and issued for valuable consideration, and this
warranty was breached. Id.
43. National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 142 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1944), aft'd, 323
U.S. 454 (1945).
44. 323 U.S. at 459. Compare U.C.C. § 3-406.
45. 552 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1977).
46. 323 U.S. at 454.
47. See, e.g., United States v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 491 F.2d 851 (8th Cir. 1974);
[Vol. 14:208
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and the bank's assertion that the imposter rule48 was the controlling
law. As stated earlier the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
agreed with the bank's position.4 9 The problem addressed in this sec-
tion is not whether the court of appeals was correct in its decision to
classify the principal case as an imposter case rather than a forgery
case. This decision is not entirely consistent with the views of other
federal courts on this issue, and indeed the Ninth Circuit itself has
viewed the matter in several lights.50
How these conflicts are resolved factually is of little significance.
The following analysis should serve to demonstrate instead that the use
of the U.C.C. as the source of the federal common law would eliminate
such conflicts. Such a rule would provide uniformity for federal
courts, as well as to allow consistency between federal and state deci-
sions on similar issues. This consistency would result as a matter of
course in light of the adoption of articles 3 and 4 of the U.C.C. in all
American jurisdictions.51
The U.C.C. represents the most modern and comprehensive state-
ment of commercial law. The point to be drawn from the following
discussion is that the desirable effects of its uniformity can be seriously
undermined by its inapplicability to the federal government. The ad-
vantages of basing the federal common law of commercial paper on the
U.C.C. can be illustrated by a comparison of the approaches of the
U.C.C. and of the federal common law to the padded payroll exception
to the imposter rule. The conflicts among the federal courts surround-
ing this concept are similar to the conflicts between state courts which
were remedied by the adoption of the U.C.C.52
A. The Padded Payroll Exception Under the U. C. C.
The exception is codified in U.C.C. section 3-405(l)(c)53 and coy-
United States v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 438 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 864 (1971).
48. See United States v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 274 F.2d 366 (9th Cir.
1959); Atlantic Nat'l Bank v. United States, 250 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1957). See also note 3 supra
and accompanying text.
49. See notes 4-7 supra and accompanying text.
50. See notes 60-65 supra and accompanying text.
51. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
52. See note 66 infra and accompanying text.
53. U.C.C. § 3-405 states:
(1) An indorsement by any person in the name of a named payee is effective if
(c) an agent or employee of the maker or drawer has supplied him with the name
of the payee intending the latter to have no such interest.
1978]
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ers situations in which an agent or employee of the maker or drawer
provides him with the name of a payee while intending that the named
payee have no interest nor receive any proceeds from the instrument.
It is irrelevant whether the named payee is an existing person so long as
the agent or employee procuring the instrument intended that the
named payee have no interest in it.54 Thereafter, an endorsement by
any person in the name of the named payee is effective and is not a
forged endorsement. 5 In the absence of a forged endorsement, there
can be no breach of a collecting or presenting bank's warranty of prior
endorsements. 6
The policy behind the exception is that the loss in such a situation
should fall on the drawer-employer as a risk of doing business rather
than on a subsequent holder or drawee.57 The policy is stated in the
comments to the section:
The reasons are that the employer is normally in a better posi-
tion to prevent such forgeries by reasonable care in the selec-
tion or supervision of his employees, or if he is not, is at least
in a better position to cover the loss by fidelity insurance; and
that the cost of such insurance is properly an expense of his
business rather than the business of the holder or drawee. 8
If the allocation of the loss had been put upon the holder or drawee,
such a holder could never be fully protected unless it could verify that
the endorser was, in fact, the named payee. This burdensome proce-
dure would definitely inhibit the transferability and negotiability of
commercial paper. Furthermore, since it was the employer's negli-
gence in hiring or failing to supervise properly his employees which
caused the issuance of the fraudulent instrument, that negligent em-
ployer should bear the resulting loss. Therefore, under the U.C.C. the
loss in a padded payroll situation is borne by the employer-drawer
rather than by subsequent holders. This appears to be the most fair
and commercially reasonable allocation of the risk and resultant loss.5 9
54. U.C.C. § 3-405, comment 1.
55. U.C.C. § 3-405(I). This will mean that the drawer can be held liable on his contract,
U.C.C. § 3-413(2), rather than the holder or presenting bank's being liable under a particular
warranty, U.C.C. §§ 3-417, 4-207.
56. U.C.C. §§ 3-417(1), 4-207(1).
57. U.C.C. § 3-405, comment 4.
58. Id.
59. For a discussion of the padded payroll exception under U.C.C. § 3405, see generally
Whaley & Yegerlehner, Imposters, Insurance and the UC.C., 5 CRElGHTON L. REV. 60 (1971) and
Comment, The Resolution of Padded Payroll Cases by the Uniform Commercial Code: A Pandora'r
Box, 9 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 379 (1968).
[Vol. 14:208
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B. The Padded Payroll Exception Under the Federal Common Law
The exception does exist under the federal common law although
its scope is substantially less than under the U.C.C. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Bank ofAmerica National
Trust & Savings Association (1959)60 rejected the exception as it is
stated in section 3-405(l)(c) of the U.C.C. and which would have
placed liability on the Government, holding instead that the National
Metropolitan decision required that the bank be liable. The facts are
as follows. Two enlisted men of the United States Navy were perform-
ing duties in the disbursing office of the U.S.S. Coral Sea. One of the
men obtained a discharged shipmate's identification card and substi-
tuted his own photograph for that of the card's true owner. The two
schemers then prepared and presented Treasury checks, payable to the
discharged man, to the ship's disbursing officer who signed the checks.
The defrauding seamen forged the endorsement of the named payee
and through the use of the false identification card were able to cash
the checks at a bank. The Government paid the checks and upon dis-
covery of the fraud sought reimbursement from the bank on the basis
of its guaranty of prior endorsements.6" The court felt that the Na-
tional Metropolitan decision absolved the Government from its negli-
gence in failing to discover the fraud and did not preclude the
Government's right to reimbursement from the bank. The court
stated, "[W]e cannot find that the Supreme Court has itself, since 1945,
written anything which might cause us to conclude with reasonable as-
surance that its Metropolitan decision is no longer viable. This being
so, we think that Metropolitan must now control the disposition of this
appeal."62 The result was that, even though the bank had cashed a
check on the basis of what appeared to be a valid photographic identifi-
cation card, it nevertheless was held responsible for the loss.
In contrast, the padded payroll exception was found to be applica-
ble in Atlantic National Bank v. United States.63 In Atlantic, a tax col-
lector prepared and filed income tax returns usingfictitious names for
the taxpayers and their employers, both on the returns and the attached
statements of taxes withheld. All of these false returns requested re-
60. 438 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1214. For a criticism of the result in this case, see Comment, Uniform Commercial
Code-Applicability of Section 3-405 to Federal Commercial Paper-"Padded Payroll"
Excepion-United States v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust and Savings Ass'n, 13 B.C. INDUS. &
COM. L. REv. 586 (1972).
63. 250 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1957).
1978]
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funds. The Treasury issued each of the checks on the basis of the re-
turns alone without further verification. The tax collector obtained
each of these checks and signed the names of the nonexistent payees as
an endorsement and, except for three isolated checks, added a second
endorsement in another fictitious name. The checks went through the
banking channels and ultimately were presented to and paid by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. '  Upon discovery of the fraud the
Government sought to recover payment from the banks. The district
court found in favor of the Government on the basis of the bank's
breach of its warranty of endorsements. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed:
If through fraud practiced on the Government, either by out-
siders or its own unfaithful servants, a check is delivered to
one upon the mistaken belief that it is due such person, the
endorsement of that imposter, whether in that name or in an-
other, is not a forgery and the Government's loss is not that of
a drawee who has been led to pay on the assumption that only
the one authorized by the payee has made the endorsement.
Rather, the Government's loss is that of one defrauded by a
dishonest employee who set the scheme in motion. The ne-
cessity for unfettered circulation of the Government's negotia-
ble paper not only does not require-it actually forbids-that
such a loss should be visited on the collecting banks.65
Therefore, while the circumstances in both Bank of America N TS.A.
(1959) and Atlantic involved a fraudulent scheme perpetrated on the
Government by dishonest employees, the Government was absolved
from liability in the former and had to assume liability in the latter.
The reason for this conflict among the federal courts as to when to
apply the padded payroll exception parallels the conflict under the
common law prior to the states' adoption of the U.C.C.66 The padded
payroll exception under the federal common law retains the require-
ment that the named payee be a fictitious or nonexistent person.67 The
64. Id. at 116-17.
65. Id. at 118 (footnotes omitted).
66. Compare United States v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 274 F.2d 366 (9th
Cir. 1959) and United States v. Continental-American Bank & Trust Co., 175 F.2d 271 (5th Cir.
1949) with United States v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 491 F.2d 851 (8th Cir. 1974) and United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 304 F. Supp. 955 (E.D. Pa. 1969). See also Whaley &
Yegerlehner, Imposters, Insurance and the U.C.C, 5 CREIGHTON L. REV. 60, 61-67 (1971).
67. See, ag., Bank of America Natl Trust & Say. Ass'n v. United States, 552 F.2d 302 (9th
Cir. 1977) (non-existent servicemen); Bank of America Natl Trust & Say. Ass'n v. United States,
438 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971) (discharged shipmate); Atlantic
Nat'l Bank v. United States, 250 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1957) (fictitious names); United States v.
Philadelphia National Bank, 304 F. Supp. 955 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (true persons).
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U.C.C. dispenses with this requirement and stresses the defrauder's in-
tent that the named payee have no interest in the instrument.68
Whether the named payee is fictitious is irrelevant as long as the de-
frauding party intended to receive the entire proceeds himself to the
exclusion of the named payee. Affixing the liability upon the intent of
the defrauding party is a commercially more reasonable result than
basing the determination upon whether the defrauding party uses a real
or a fictitious person as the named drawer. As a result of retaining this
latter standard for determining liability, the federal common law gov-
erning federal commercial paper is in a state of uncertainty with rela-
tion to the general commercial world. This situation is in direct
opposition to the dictates of the Supreme Court in Clea,-eld and to the
desire to have free and unrestricted negotiability of the Government's
commercial paper.
V. PROPOSALS
Two possible solutions exist to resolve the conflict between the fed-
eral common law on federal paper and the rest of the commercial
world operating under the U.C.C. The first and most comprehensive
solution would be congressional enactment of the U.C.C., articles 3 and
4, into federal law. The U.C.C. was drafted to allow for some jurisdic-
tional variations; therefore, any alterations that would be needed to
bring the articles into conformity with federal treasury and banking
regulations could certainly be provided.69 Enacting the U.C.C. into
federal law would bring certainty and uniformity into the law gov-
erning federal commercial paper. As the Supreme Court has stated,
"The United States does business on business terms. . . . [It] is not
excepted from the general rule by the largeness of its dealings and its
having to employ agents to do what if done by a principal in person
would leave no room for doubt."70 And in the area of commercial
paper the Court has said, "The United States as drawee of commercial
paper stands in no different light than any other drawee."71 Therefore,
it would be preferable for Congress to bring the law governing federal
commercial paper into conformity with the fifty states by enacting the
U.C.C., articles 3 and 4, into federal law.
68. U.C.C. § 3-405, comment 1.
69. Care must be taken not to destroy the uniformity of the substantive policies expressed in
the Code. See, e.g., Minahan, The Eroding Uniformity of the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 Ky.
LU. 799 (1977).
70. United States v. National Exch. Bank, 270 U.S. 527, 534-35 (1926).
71. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 369 (1943).
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A second solution would be an increased reliance on the U.C.C. as
a source of determining what the federal common law should be. The
problem with such an approach is the mandate of the supremacy clause
of the United States Constitution7 2 and the persuasiveness of stare deci-
sis.73 Nevertheless, the federal courts have looked upon the U.C.C. as
a source for federal law in areas such as federal government contracts.
Judge Henry J. Friendly in United States v. Wegematic Corp.74 stated:
We find persuasive the defendant's suggestions of looking to
the Uniform Commercial Code as a source for the "federal"
law of sales. . . When the states have gone so far in achiev-
ing the desirable goal of a uniform law governing commercial
transactions, it would be a distinct disservice to insist on a
different one for the segment of commerce, important but still
small in relation to the total, consisting of transactions with
the United States.7"
Furthermore, former Chief Justice Roger J. Traynor of the Supreme
Court of California has noted, "The Uniform Commercial Code has
become a major influence on the development of common law in the
federal courts to govern cases involving government contracts and
other commercial transactions. '7 6  Considering the problem of the
precedents in the Cleai7yeld and National Metropolitan decisions, it
would be most wise if the Supreme Court were to accept certiorari of
an appropriate case and declare that the U.C.C. can be looked to as a
source for determining the federal common law governing federal com-
mercial paper. Such action would bring the law of federal commercial
paper into conformity with that of private and state commercial paper.
VI. CONCLUSION
At the time of the Clear/ield decision, it was clear that despite Erie
the federal common law would govern rights and liabilities in relation
72. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
73. "We are reminded in this connection of the Court's recent expression of difficulty in
comprehending how decisions by lower courts can ever undermine the authority of a decision of
[the Supreme] Court." Federal Elec. Corp. v. United States, 486 F.2d 1377, 1382 (Ct. Cl. 1973)
(quoting United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 396 (1973)).
74. 360 F.2d 674 (2nd Cir. 1966).
75. Id. at 676. See also United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 470 F.2d 944 (8th Cir. 1973)
(U.C.C. as source for "federal law" governing FHA security interest); New York, N.H. & H.R.
Co. v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 180 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1950) (use of the Negotiable Instruments
Law as source of "federal law"); Comment, Application of the Unform Commercial Code to Fed-
eral Government Contracts Doing Business on Business Terms, 16 WM. & MARY L. Rv. 395
(1974).
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to federal commercial paper. This was appropriate in that no uniform-
ity could be had by looking to the disparity of state laws governing
commercial paper. Today, however, the federal common law of fed-
eral commercial paper has lost its uniformity through frequent clashes
with the concepts of the U.C.C. as applied by the states. Although
there is arguably a uniform federal rule governing federal commercial
paper, that rule is certainly inconsistent with commercial reality in the
fifty states.
It is time Congress acted to bring federal law into harmony with
the commercial world. In the absence of congressional action, the fed-
eral judiciary should look upon the U.C.C. as a valid and persuasive
source for determining the substance of the federal common law. In
the words of Justice Clark, "The commercial interests of our country
would be better served if interested parties could expect uniformity in
the federal and state court's application of commercial law. To this
end, we would urge Congress to adopt. . . the U.C.C. for federal ap-
plication, as our fifty states have already done for local application."77
Stephen A. Becker
77. 552 F.2d 302, 303 n.1 (9th Cir. 1977).
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